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Argument from Expert Opinion as
Legal Evidence: Critical Questions
and Admissibility Criteria of Expert
Testimony in the American Legal
System*
DAVID M. GODDEN AND DOUGLAS WALTON
Abstract. While courts depend on expert opinions in reaching sound judgments, the
role of the expert witness in legal proceedings is associated with a litany of
problems. Perhaps most prevalent is the question of under what circumstances
should testimony be admitted as expert opinion. We review the changing policies
adopted by American courts in an attempt to ensure the reliability and usefulness
of the scientific and technical information admitted as evidence. We argue that
these admissibility criteria are best seen in a dialectical context as a set of critical
questions of the kind commonly used in models of argumentation.

There are four independent streams of research on expert opinion as
evidence that are now at a point of convergence. The first is the longstanding concern in law with standards for the use of expert testimony in
providing evidence in trials, and the changing rules for admissibility of this
kind of evidence. The second is the growing literature in argumentation
theory on argument from expert opinion as an argumentation scheme, or
defeasible form of argument (Walton and Reed 2003). The third is the
flowering of recent work in artificial intelligence and law (Schum 1994;
Prakken and Sartor 1996, 2003), using argumentation schemes to represent
forms of reasoning in law that are modeled in artificial intelligence (Walton
2005; Bex et al. 2003). In recent work of this sort, argument from expert
* Research for this paper was made possible by separate research grants from the Social
Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada held by each of the authors. The authors
would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of Ratio Juris for their helpful comments.
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opinion is the scheme most commonly taken as the leading case for
studying how to identify, analyze and evaluate forms of argument used in
law (Gordon 2005). The fourth is the new evidence scholarship (Anderson,
Schum and Twining 2005) that applies technical tools and heuristics, like
Wigmore diagrams, to the reconstruction of chains of evidential reasoning
in trials, like the infamous trial of Sacco and Vanzetti. All four streams
work with the same structure of rational argument, in which one party in
a discussion uses the opinion of an expert to rationally convince another
party to accept some proposition that the second party doubts. It is now
long past time to bring these four streams together, so that researchers in
each group can be informed about the parallel and overlapping work of
researchers in the other three groups. The function of this paper is to carry
out the interdisciplinary project of informing each of the four groups about
how the work of the other groups relates to their own research initiatives.
A large part of the problem for many scholars interested in expert opinion
evidence is that Anglo-American law has undergone rapid and important
changes in recent years, reflected in the changing criteria employed in the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). Thus a large part of the paper consists in
summarizing and making sense of these developments in light of the
concerns and methods of the other three streams of research. The goal is
to put the problems currently faced in a clear perspective so that future
interdisciplinary research on expert opinion evidence, of a kind that is
much needed, will be made possible, and so that research in each field will
be assisted.
I. Expert Opinion in Argumentation and Law
Argument from expert opinion (also called appeal to expert opinion) is a
form of argument long held to be a fallacy in logic. However, recent work
on argumentation has shown that it represents a form of reasoning that can
sometimes be fallacious but that is often necessary, and can be reasonable
under the right conditions of use (Walton 1997). The most obvious instance
is the use of expert testimony in law, a form of argumentation that is so
powerful and common in trials that it has now come to dominate as a form
of evidence in Anglo-American law. American law, in particular, has
struggled with the problem of devising criteria for dealing with expert
opinion evidence, and it is the treatment of expert opinion in the American
legal system that will be the focus of this paper.1 Many of us have heard
1

As Damaska 1997 has shown, it is mainly American law that approached the problem of
expert evidence by providing a kind of criteria-based approach to admissibility. Continental
law has relied on court-appointed experts and has tended to defer to them, while English law
has approached the problem in a more gradualist manner (Damaska 1997, 151; Redmayne
2001). Indeed, especially following the Wolf reforms, the manner in which British courts have
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about landmark cases like Daubert2 and Kumho Tire3, and such cases have
been tangentially written about in argumentation theory. But those
working in argumentation have not so far been well informed about the
evolution of these legal criteria and their relationship to the work on the
argumentation scheme for appeal to expert opinion. This is a great shame,
for in our opinion expert evidence in law is an important subject in its own
right, but is also one in which argumentation can play an important role.
It is a subject that shows to students of argumentation why argument from
expert opinion, although problematic, is by no means inherently fallacious.
The argumentation scheme and its accompanying set of critical questions
has become the tool of choice in argumentation studies for evaluating such
arguments. We show how this scheme relates to the criteria, like the
Daubert criteria, that have evolved in law to deal with expert testimony in
trials. The main purpose of our exposition is to summarize the leading
developments in the treatment of expert opinion evidence in law, from an
argumentation perspective, and to show how current research on appeal to
expert opinion as a form of fallible argumentation can help throw light on
some serious problems with it. The ultimate goal of analyzing and evaluating such evidence as a species of rational argumentation by established
criteria that have proved their worth is a collaborative research project for
the future for argumentation researchers and legal professionals.
II. The Dilemma of Expert Knowledge in Law
The specialization of knowledge through scientific and technical advancement presents a unique dilemma to the legal system. On the one hand, we
surely do not want the rulings and decisions of the court not to be founded
on—or worse, to be at odds with—the best available technical or scientific
knowledge (Black et al. 1994, 719).4 Yet, on the other hand, attempts to
incorporate the technical and scientific elements of our knowledge into the
legal procedure are associated with a litany of problems.

handled scientific evidence in civil proceedings has moved away from the American
approach. Similarly, as Burkhard Schafer observed to us, in continental legal systems, the
combination of the principle of free evaluation of proof—freie Beweiswürdigung in German
law—(see Art 261 StPo [Criminal Procedural Code] and Art 286 ZPO [Civil procedural code])
and the inquisitorial principle (in Germany, Art 155ff StPo) ensure that there are no equivalent
formal rules that constrain the judge in the use of expert witness testimony and give him wide
ranging discretion in interpreting, accepting, or rejecting such evidence. On the limited rules
on expert evidence, see Art 72–93 stop—none of them however deal with the issues discussed
in the cases analyzed here.
2
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 1993.
3
Kumho Tire Co. v Patrick Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1999.
4
For example, Black et al. cite a 1946 case (Berry v Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442 [Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1946]) in which “a California court found that Charlie Chaplin had fathered a child, even
though the child’s blood type made paternity impossible” (ibid.).
Ratio Juris, Vol. 19, No. 3
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Perhaps the most general of these is that judges and juries are often
required to make judgments in cases where they lack specific knowledge
pertaining to the facts at issue in a case. The problem here is not so much
one of the unavailability of evidence (which could also occur), as one of the
fact-finder not having knowledge regarding the significance or probative
weight of evidence that is available. Being ill-equipped to determine these
matters for themselves, judges and juries must often rely on the knowledge
of others in reaching their decisions.
Indeed, with the increasing role of technology and other highly specialized fields of knowledge in our society, courts have become increasingly
dependent on experts in those fields when deciding upon matters. Quite
often, the courts are dependent on experts in their attempts to reach
informed, scientifically sound verdicts. For example, Owen (2002) observes
that knowledge of product design and manufacture is often required when
determining a liability issue relating to possible product defectiveness.
“[J]uries normally need the guidance of expert testimony to understand the
technical aspects of both defectiveness and causation. Without such testimony, juries would be left to surmise, conjecture and speculation on these
central elements of every case and cause” (Owen 2002, 347). Even in
routine matters, courts have become dependent upon experts when conducting the day-to-day business of justice.
So, whenever experts are involved with a court proceeding, it is in a
situation where the fact-finders are dependent upon them in an epistemic
sense. Because of this, the expert often appears as an authority that judges
and juries are unfit to question or challenge, and to whom judges and
juries will be tempted to defer in their judgments. Yet, if this happens the
trial is in effect being decided by the experts rather than the courts. This
situation is only aggravated by the fact that experts often have competing
opinions, and trials can easily become a “battle of the experts” which the
juries, by hypothesis, do not have the capacity to adjudicate (Hand 1901,
54–5; Walton 1997, 171–6). Moreover, with the increasing dependence on
expert, scientific knowledge there appears also to have been a tremendous
increase in the amount of “junk science” making its way into the courts
through the testimony given in the expert witness box (Huber 1991; see
also Chesebro 1993; McGarity 2004). These problems speak to the need to
regulate expert knowledge in the courtroom.

III. A Brief History of the Treatment of Expert Testimony
in American Law
In order to appreciate how this regulatory problem has been treated in law,
it is worthwhile to briefly examine the development of the treatment of
expert knowledge by the American legal system.
© 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Early History
It is well known that, today, expert knowledge finds its way into the
courtroom by way of the testimony of expert witnesses. The expert
witness, in turn, is typically introduced in the overall context of the
adversarial process as representing one or other party in the litigation. But
this was not always the case. Judge Learned Hand writes:
In early times, and before trial by jury was much developed, there seem to have
been two modes of using what expert knowledge there was: First, to select as
jurymen such persons as were by experience especially fitted to know the class of
facts which lay before them, and second, to call to the aid of the court skilled
persons whose opinion it might adopt or not as it pleased. (Hand 1901, 40)

Indeed, before the adversarial system took its present form, juries functioned as investigative bodies (as opposed to deliberative ones), conducting
independent inquires into the facts of a case as a means of reaching a
verdict (Hand 1901, 44). It is important to keep this in mind, not only in
understanding the historical development of the current system, but also to
be aware of alternatives to the current system. Indeed, some features of the
old system remain. While juries no longer have an investigative role and
special juries are no longer convened, courts remain entitled to call upon
independent, court-appointed experts.
As the jury system developed, and the idea that a fair trial involved a
trial by a jury of one’s peers became an entrenched principle, the method
of special juries was abandoned. Further, the investigative role of juries
was abandoned in the adversarial system that adopted the principle that
a jury should determine a case solely on the basis of the evidence
presented before it. In this context, the place of expertise in the courts
changed dramatically from that of expert juries to that of expert witnesses. Expert witnesses first appeared in the early seventeenth century,
and in the eighteenth century the practice was well established (Hand
1901, 45–9). Eventually, the role of the expert witness became established
by statute.
The Special Role of Experts
Before considering issues surrounding admissibility and acceptance of
expert testimony, it is important to understand what makes the testimony
of experts legally different from other kinds of testimony and evidence.
There is an important difference between the type of testimony that can be
offered by an expert in contrast to a non-expert witness. Normally witnesses are quite limited in the kind of testimony they can give into
evidence. While witnesses are permitted to report on those things which
they directly experienced, witnessed, heard, said or did, they are generally
Ratio Juris, Vol. 19, No. 3
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denied the opportunity to give an opinion on the significance of these
things, or to speculate on other related matters (such as what might be
inferred from what they have experienced).5 Experts, on the other hand, are
permitted much more leeway in regards to the matters on which they can
offer testimony.
Perhaps most importantly, experts can offer opinions as to what inferences should be drawn from either those things they have directly experienced, or from data that they typically rely upon in their field of expertise
(FRE, Rule 703). That is, within their field of expertise, experts are permitted not only to report their experience but to speculate upon (or draw
inferences from) that experience, and the court will treat those speculations
as testimony. Moreover, Rule 703 provides that experts are allowed to base
their opinions on what might otherwise be called hearsay, in that they are
allowed to take as their base data things they have not directly experienced
(e.g., information contained in a lab report). In effect, this creates two
kinds of evidence, often called “fact-based evidence” (which would
include circumstantial evidence and direct testimony) and “opinion-based
evidence” (which would include the speculative testimony of expert witnesses). Because experts are permitted to offer “opinion-based evidence,”
issues surrounding its classification and admissibility are especially acute.
Early Determination of Expertise
In the early days, the standard of success in the marketplace was used to
qualify a person as an expert. “Expertise was implied from the expert’s
success in an occupation or profession which embraced that knowledge”
(Faigman et al. 1994, 1804). Faigman et al. identify several problems with
this approach. First, the marketplace test is too broad because “[t]he market
not only selects for validity, it selects also for entertainment, desire, wishful
thinking, hope, sometimes even desperation [. . .] The marketplace test is
incapable of distinguishing astrophysics from astrology” (Faigman et al.
1994, 1805). Secondly, the marketplace test is too narrow since some fields
of knowledge have little or no market value (ibid.). Finally, the marketplace
test “conflates the expert and the expertise” (ibid.), and so fails to ensure
the reliability of the testimony.
5

Federal Rule of Evidence 701 provides certain exceptions for this prohibition, stating that
“the witness testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to
a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact at issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [. . .].” In effect, witnesses
can be permitted to report on the inferences they made, or opinions they formed, on the basis
of their experience. In general though, witnesses are not permitted to speculate upon matters
beyond their own experience, or on the probative significance of the facts to which they are
testifying.

© 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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In view of the failings of the marketplace test, another standard of
admissibility was required. From this point on, the treatment of expert
testimony in the American legal system is usually described in relation to
a series of landmark rulings as well as the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Each of these rules and rulings either sets or clarifies the
standard of admissibility for expert testimony, and together they describe
the history of the development of this standard.
Frye
The first of these landmark decisions is Frye.6 In 1923, the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia was called upon to determine the admissibility
of the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test as indicative of the
truthfulness of a defendant. (The systolic blood pressure test was an early
version of current polygraph “lie-detector” devices.) The test was based on
“[a scientific] theory which seems to be that the truth is spontaneous [. . .]
while the utterance of a falsehood requires a conscious effort, which is
reflected in the blood Pressure” (Frye at 1014). In order to accept the
significance of the test results, the court was being asked to accept the truth
of this theory. In effect then, the expert testimony was offered not only to
report the results of the test itself, but also in support of the truth of the
theory behind the test. The problem was that the test and the theory
behind it were rather novel at that time.
To resolve this problem, the court prescribed an admissibility criterion
for expert testimony which has come to be known as the “general acceptance test” which the court described as follows.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
to which it belongs. (Frye at 1014)

This general acceptance test became widely adopted in American courts as
a criterion for admissibility of expert or scientific knowledge. As Faigman
et al. describe, following Frye the test changed from the success of the
expert in the marketplace, to the success the expertise in the “intellectual
marketplace” (Faigman et al. 1994, 1805). According to this criterion, the
results of the systolic blood pressure test were determined to be inadmissible as evidence.
6

Frye v United States, 293 F. 1013, D.C. Circ., 1923.

Ratio Juris, Vol. 19, No. 3
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The apparent benefits of the general acceptance test are that it can be
applied and the results determined with relative ease by a non-specialist.
On the other hand, there are both theoretical and practical problems with
adopting this as a stand-alone admissibility criterion for expert knowledge.
A significant theoretical problem is that even a reliable, well-established
methodology might, nevertheless, not be generally accepted in a field.
Similarly, as Beecher-Monas writes, “much knowledge slips into general
acceptance without any careful examination, especially where that knowledge has been accepted for a long time” (Beecher-Monas 1998, 60; citing
Faigman et al. 1994, 1799, 1811 and n. 37; Abelson 1962, 75). A second
problem is that the general acceptance test could easily produce results that
contradict the “second axiom” of evidence law that “all facts having rational
probative value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids” (Wigmore
1940, 293, par. 10). Under the test, a relevant fact could be excluded merely
because it is not generally accepted, or because it is based on a principle
which is not generally accepted. Indeed, this was precisely the argument
raised in McCormick’s widely used text on evidence. There, McCormick
argued that “[a]ny relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified
expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for
exclusion” (McCormick 1954, 363; as cited by Black et al. 1994, 722; see also
Giannelli 1980, 1233). A third theoretical problem is what to do when there
are several generally accepted theories, methodologies or principles which
together yield opposing (contradictory or contrary) claims.
The possibility of competing theories leads to the practical problem of
how to select between them. And this is but an instance of a larger practical
problem raised by Black et al. (1994). Following Giannelli (1980, 1208–23),
Black et al. argue that “a court applying Frye has to decide what must be
accepted, what constitutes the relevant field of science, and what demonstrates acceptance, and making these decisions requires the very understanding of science that Frye ostensibly avoids” (Black et al. 1994, 726–7).
As such, it would seem that the standard of general acceptance does not
provide a sound or practical admissibility criterion for expert testimony.

Federal Rules of Evidence
In the wake of criticisms like these, the United States Congress adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975. These Rules specified a new standard
of admissibility for expert testimony stated in FRE, Rule 702 as follows (see
Daubert at 588; Berger 2001, 292, n. 14):
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue, a witness qualified as
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise. (FRE, Rule 702)
© 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Not only does FRE, Rule 702 abandon the standard of general acceptance,
but it explicitly seeks to include any knowledge that will be helpful to the
trier of facts in a case. As such, the first general standard of admissibility
is that of relevance. The second general standard is reliability, although the
reliability criterion is only implicitly stated in the original rule.7 In effect,
the Federal Rules of Evidence changed the admissibility criterion for expert
testimony from general acceptance to relevance and reliability.
While the criteria of relevance and reliability appear to be more substantive than general acceptance, several problems occurred following their
introduction in the Federal Rules of Evidence. In addition to the vague
criteria of reliability originally provided, the Rule did not make any
reference to the Frye decision, and so appeared not to take into account the
general acceptance criterion articulated therein. This left many courts in an
interpretive vacuum, and many still applied the more intuitive general
acceptance criterion of Frye.
Haack (2003) characterizes the interval following the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as a period in which it remained unclear
whether the Federal Rules were superseded by, or complemented by the
Frye Rule. On her description, this interval has been characterized by legal
wrangling over expert testimony in which science has become entangled
with law in a “bramble bush.” The evolving set of rules, precedents and
standards set by the law to handle scientific evidence has been “entangled”
with controversies on fundamental issues of how expert testimony can be
defined as a kind of evidence based on scientific input.
For Haack (2004, 15) the problem arises from the tension between the
adversary system of American legal culture and the open-ended fallibilism
of scientific research. Advocacy may be defined as an attempt to make a
case for the truth of some designated proposition by arguing for it in order
to persuade an audience to accept it. In contrast, scientific inquiry is an
attempt to discover the truth of some question by seeking out all the
possible evidence available, and drawing only such conclusions as the
evidence warrants. As Haack (2004, 18) describes it, the conflict between
these two procedures is a clash of cultures. From our point of view, we see
the clash as a difference between two types of dialogue or investigative

7

Subsequently, in its Daubert decision (1993), the Federal Supreme Court would rule that the
criterion of reliability was implicit in the notion of “scientific knowledge” mentioned in Rule
702. In part, the Court found as follows: “[t]he subject of an expert’s testimony must be
‘scientific [. . .] knowledge.’ The adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science. Similarly, the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief
or unsupported speculation. The term ‘applies to any body of known facts or to any body of
ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.’ [Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1252 (1986)] [. . .] In short, the requirement that an expert’s testimony
pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability” (Daubert at
589).
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procedures, with different standards of evidence and different burdens of
proof that are applied to the same sequence of argumentation. In our
terms, there is a shift from one context of investigation to another, a shift
from a scientific inquiry dialogue to a persuasion dialogue of the kind that
takes place in a trial.
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
For almost 20 years this interpretative vacuum and legal “bramble bush”
remained, until 1993 when the Federal Supreme Court ruled in the matter
of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. In the Daubert case several crucial
facts at issue depended on the admissibility of scientific evidence indicating a causal relationship between the ingestion of Bendectin (a prescription
drug for morning sickness) during pregnancy and subsequent birth defects
in children. Previously, this evidence had been deemed inadmissible by the
court because it had not been published and did not meet the general
acceptance criterion.
The Supreme Court determined that the Federal Rules of Evidence
superseded the Frye test, and thus affirmed the standard of relevance and
reliability. In regards to the Frye standard, the Court found that “[n]othing
in the text of this Rule [702] establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute
prerequisite to admissibility” (Daubert at 588). Instead, the Court affirmed
that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible” subject to specific exclusionary
conditions (FRE, Rule 402; see Daubert at 587).8 Further, in affirming the
standard of reliability, the Court ruled that “under the Rules the trial judge
must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
not only relevant but reliable” (Daubert at 589).
This ruling was seen to ascribe a “gatekeeper” role to trial judges,
placing on them a duty to examine and evaluate the soundness of the
scientific theories being employed in their courts. Aware that the Rules of
Evidence did not provide any explicit criteria for the determination of
reliability, the Supreme Court attempted to provide some guidelines that
could be used to assist in decisions about the admissibility of expert
knowledge. The Court provided some general criteria that have come to be
known as the “Daubert factors”:
(1) Testability: “whether it [the evidence, theory or technique] can be (and has
been) tested”
(2) Error Rate: “the known or potential rate of error”
(3) Peer Review: “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication”
8

The Rules define “relevant evidence” as evidence having “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence” (FRE, Rule 401; see Daubert at 587).

© 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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(4) General Acceptance: the “explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance
within that community”. (Daubert at 594)

In addition to these four generally cited criteria, Owen (2002, 358; following the notes to the amendment of FRE, Rule 702) cites a fifth criterion:
(5) Control Standards: whether its operation has been subjected to appropriate
standards of control [italics added].

These criteria mark the first explicit statements by the Court of the criteria
which could be employed in reaching admissibility decisions. Importantly,
the Daubert factors were introduced by the Court not as a universal and
exhaustive check-list (Daubert at 594) but as guidelines, to be applied where
appropriate, perhaps with other relevant and useful criteria. Procedurally,
these criteria are applied in pre-trial “Daubert hearings” held for the sole
purpose of determining the admissibility of an expert’s testimony in a
given case. However, even following the introduction of these explicit
Daubert factors, unresolved problems remained.
General Electric Co. v Joiner
One of the first matters to be settled was the degree of discretion that
courts had in applying these Daubert factors and making determinations
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. In 1997, the Federal
Supreme Court ruled that neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of Evidence gave an appeal court any special grounds or power to overturn a
decision of admissibility made by a lower court. Instead, courts retained
discretionary autonomy in making admissibility decisions, and “abuse of
discretion is the proper standard of review of a district court’s evidentiary
rulings” (Joiner9 at 141).
Eventually, following the Kumho decision (see below) at least three
dimensions of discretionary autonomy would be established regarding
determinations of the admissibility of expert testimony: (i) “procedural
discretion” concerning when and how to conduct reliability analysis; (ii)
“substantive discretion” concerning what factors ought to be considered;
and finally (iii) “decisional discretion” concerning the results of the reliability analysis (Harvard Law Review 2003, 2146).10
A second, important feature of the Joiner decision pertains to the instruction, apparent in Daubert, that admissibility decisions should consider only
9

General Electric Company v Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 1997.
Problematically, these discretions—especially substantive and decisional discretion—have
led to contradictory findings from one court to the next (Harvard Law Review 2003, 2146–9).
10

Ratio Juris, Vol. 19, No. 3
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methodological issues and not the acceptability of the results. The Court in
Daubert found that “[t]he focus, of course, [on determinations or reliability]
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate” (Daubert at 595). Against this the Court in Joiner ruled that
“conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another”
(Joiner at 146), and hence that a trial judge could consider the acceptability
of the results (or conclusions) of an expert as well as his or her methodology. This too served to increase the court’s substantive discretion in
admissibility decisions.
The general idea informing these rulings seems to be that the Daubert
factors are guidelines whose purpose is to assist courts in making admissibility decisions, rather than epistemological “security checks” which must
be rigorously applied by the courts and through which every expert’s
testimony must pass.
Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael
Another challenge to the Daubert decision concerned whether the Daubert
factors applied only to scientific evidence, or to other kinds of evidence
that might be considered expert testimony. In 1999 the United States
Supreme Court found that the “language [of Rule 702] makes no relevant
distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge. It makes clear that any such knowledge might become
the subject of expert testimony” (Kumho at 147).
Not only did the Court find that there were no grounds to distinguish
between scientific and other technical or specialized knowledge in classifying testimony as expert, it also found that the attempt to do so would be
impractical.
Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction
between “scientific” knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge.
There is no clear line that divides the one from the others [. . .] Neither is there a
convincing need to make such distinctions. Experts of all kinds tie observations to
conclusions through the use of what Judge Learned Hand called “general truths
derived from [. . .] specialized experience” [Hand 1901, 54]. (Kumho at 148)

What seems to be the determining factor here is not whether the testimony
is scientific in nature, so much as whether the information it presents is
“beyond the ken” (Krigis 2002, 512) of the normal juror (or judge), and
outside of the general background knowledge jurors might reasonably be
presumed to possess.
In determining the scope of knowledge that might qualify as expert
testimony, the Court in Kumho made the important point that the testimony
need not be based on a theoretical knowledge of a field and relying on “the
© 2006 The Authors. Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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application of scientific principles,” but could instead be based on “skill- or
experience-based observation” (Kumho at 151; citing Carmichael11 at 1435).
For instance, the Kumho court considers the example of “a witness whose
expertise is based purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to
distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff ” (Kumho at 151).
Having clarified the scope of knowledge that might qualify as expert
testimony, the Court in Kumho went on to find that the admissibility criteria
applied to this testimony should reflect the different bases from which this
knowledge is drawn. Because of this, the Court reiterated that “Daubert
makes clear that the factors it mentions do not constitute a ‘definitive
checklist or test’ [Daubert at 593]” for admissibility (Kumho at 150). Rather,
“a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert
where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony”
(Kumho at 152). In general, the Court in Kumho found that it was the
responsibility of the trial judge to ensure that expert testimony was
relevant and reliable, but that the criteria to be used in making this
determination should be specifically matched to the testimony under
consideration. Thus reliability criteria are, to a significant degree, contextdependent and situation-specific.
Amendment to FRE, Rule 702
To reflect the developments made in the courts, in 2000 several amendments were made to the Federal Rules of Evidence with the aim of
clarifying the Rules and eliminating loopholes. For instance, Rule 701 was
amended to eliminate the possibility of “proffering an expert in lay-witness
clothing” (FRE, Rule 701, notes). This was achieved by distinguishing
between expert and lay testimony as opposed to expert and lay witnesses
(ibid.), and requiring that any testimony classified as expert (i.e., “based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”; ibid.) be subject to
scrutiny regarding its reliability.
Further, Rule 702 was amended as follows to include a specific statement
of three admissibility criteria for expert testimony.
[A qualified expert may testify] if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is a product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.12

Following its amendment, Rule 702 clarifies the notion of reliability by
specifying three individually necessary but jointly sufficient standards that
constitute reliability.
11

Carmichael v Samyang Tire Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1997.
This amendment was added directly to the end of the original Rule 702 (stated above), the
text of which was otherwise unchanged.
12
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1. sufficiency of facts or data
2. reliability of principles and methods
3. reliability of application of these principles and methods to the facts
of the case.
So, while there is no universal test for determining whether any given
piece of testimony qualifies as expert, opinion-based evidence, it is necessary that the standards of reliability and relevance be met in each case.
As to how the standard of reliability is to be met in any given instance,
the Rules of Evidence leave this largely to the discretion of individual trial
judges. While affirming the Daubert factors as useful guidelines, the notes
to the FRE, Rule 702 amendment also suggest the following additional
criteria.
1. Whether experts are “proposing to testify about matters growing naturally
and directly out of research they have conducted independent to the litigation,
or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for the purposes of
testifying” [Daubert at 1317].
2. Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise
to an unfounded conclusion [with reference to Joiner at 146].
3. Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations [with reference to Claar v Burlington13].
4. Whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his regular
professional work outside his paid litigation consulting” [Sheehan v Daily
Racing Form Inc.14 at 942].
5. Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable
results for the type of opinion the expert would give [with reference to Kumho
at 1175]. (FRE, Rule 702, notes; see also Owen 2002, 361–2)

The Rules allow that no criterion is individually necessary, and further
allow that other factors may also be relevant (ibid.). Indeed, since the
revision of the Rules, other criteria have also been suggested. For example,
the Harvard Law Review (2003, 2144) lists other factors that have been
considered by other courts. Among these they cite:
6. “the technique’s relationship to other techniques established to be reliable”
7. “the non-litigation-related uses to which the method has been put”
8. “whether he [the expert] has sufficiently connected his testimony with the
facts of the case.” (Ibid.)

Together, all of these factors contribute to the assessment of the reliability
and relevance of testimony offered as expert knowledge and so help to
determine the admissibility of the testimony.

13
14

Claar v Burlington N.R.R., 29 F. 3d 499, 9th Cir., 1994.
Sheehan v Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 7th Cir., 1997.
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Yet, as with all other evidence in a trial, the determination of admissibility is not the only stage for the assessment for expert testimony. Like
other evidence presented in a court, expert testimony is effectively tested
twice. First it must meet the court’s criteria for admissibility as evidence.
Second, its merit, weight or significance will be tested through the normal
adversarial process of the trial system. At this second stage the evidence of
the expert is evaluated not for its admissibility, but for its acceptability. It
is here where it will be determined whether the expert testimony has met
the burden of persuasion with respect to the particular facts at issue
relevant to the expert testimony.
Importantly then, the Daubert factors are not criteria for the acceptability
of expert testimony; rather, this is determined at trial. The Court in Daubert
ruled, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence” (Daubert at
596). The adversarial process can involve many other factors pertinent to
the assessment of testimony presented as expert knowledge, such as
cross-examination and the evidence of other, conflicting expertise. Importantly, the opposing lawyer can re-ask all or some of the questions which
were put to the expert at the Daubert hearing. This can have at least two
functions, one positive and one negative. First, since the jury (if any) will
not have heard of the expert’s successful answers in the Daubert hearing,
presenting them will increase the credibility of the expert. On the other
hand, should an opposing lawyer feel that some of the expert’s responses
in the Daubert hearing were weak or unacceptable, then he could try to
expose that to the jury.
In summary, the admissibility requirements for expert testimony are that
it is relevant and reliable. Expert testimony need not be based on theoretical knowledge, but can also be based on skill or experience. In part
because of this, there are a variety of factors that have been recommended
in order to determine whether the testimony qualifies as expertise. None of
these factors are either necessary or sufficient. Instead, they may be
considered insofar as they are “reasonable measures of reliability” (Kumho
at 152). Trial judges have procedural, substantive and decisional discretion
in determining when and how to determine admissibility, what factors
should be considered and the results of the tests.
Given this situation, the question of how these factors ought to be
considered arises. What status do they have in the context of the legal
procedure? What is the legal effect of posing one of these criteria to a
potential expert, and what are the obligations of the potential expert in
responding to them? In the remainder of the paper, we argue that
argumentation theory can provide a workable and insightful model for
representing and theorizing about the legal processes surrounding admissibility decisions of expert testimony. On this model, admissibility factors
Ratio Juris, Vol. 19, No. 3
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are best seen as having the status of critical questions relating to the
argumentation scheme for expert opinion. Further, like critical questions,
the argumentative effect of posing one of these criteria is explained in
terms of shifting the burden of proof in the argumentative discussion.
More broadly, then, the admissibility stage is seen as a sub-stage in a larger
argumentative dialogue representing the entire trial procedure.
IV. Differences between Run-of-the-Mill Experts and Expert Opinion
in Law
One might be tempted to think that any general model for arguments
involving expert opinion will not be directly applicable in a specifically
legal context. After all, there are several significant differences between the
way that arguments from expert opinion occur and are treated in law and
in more general cases of day-to-day reasoning and argument. First, quite
often our engagement with experts in everyday life occurs in a context
where we are trying to get information which we do not have. For
example, we consult with a doctor about a medical condition, we confer
with financial advisors about investments, or we seek advice from a
mechanic about servicing our motor vehicle. In these kinds of situations,
our interaction with the expert might best be classified as an informationseeking dialogue. Yet, in a court proceeding, our interaction with the expert
will seldom occur in the context of an information-seeking dialogue.
Instead, the expert will be playing a role in trying to establish one or more
of the premises being used in a persuasion dialogue (specifically, a
dissent).15
Similarly, quite frequently in day-to-day argument the expert can be
absent or even unidentified. Often some written source, like an encyclopedia or a scientific report quoted in the media, is cited as an authoritative
source that backs up an arguer’s opinion. In such a case, the authority
might not even be identified, and the respondent cannot actually dialogue
with the expert. By contrast, in a legal proceeding, the expert is always not
only identified, but is present in person and his or her opinion can be
subject to cross-examination and critical argument.
These differences might lead one to think that the general treatment of
arguments from expert opinion as given in argumentation theory cannot
offer much guidance to their treatment in legal contexts. We now proceed
to argue that this is not the case. Indeed, we argue that the general
probative function of expert testimony in a legal context can be modeled
on the general scheme for argument from expert opinion given below.
Expert testimony is defeasible: Not only is it subject to counter-argument
(e.g., in cross-examination), and to rebuttal from other available evidence
15

Although information-seeking dialogues could be nested within this larger context.
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(e.g., opposing testimony from other expert witnesses), but it is also subject
to retraction should new evidence be discovered as a result of subsequent
investigation. As such, even in law, expert testimony cannot conclusively
establish the acceptability of a proposition. Thus the model we propose is
that of the following defeasible argumentation scheme with its accompanying set of critical questions.
Scheme for Argument from Expert Opinion
Walton (2002, 49–50) gives the argument scheme as follows:
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing
proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A is true (false)
Conclusion: A is true (false).16
A central feature of arguments from expert opinion is that they are, in
general, not conclusive but rather presumptive or plausibilistic in nature.
That is, they do not lead necessarily to their conclusion, but instead
provide reasonable grounds for the conclusion relative to certain epistemic
circumstances. Yet, should these circumstances change (for instance, when
new information is obtained) the argument could be weakened and subject
to retraction. That said, plausible arguments are not without probative
force. When making an assertion, an arguer (the proponent) incurs a
burden of proof, and is obliged to provide reasons in support of her claim
when called upon to do so. A presumptive argument meets this burden of
proof, and has the argumentative effect of shifting the burden of proof to
the objector (or respondent) of the argument. So, while inconclusive, such
arguments provide presumptive support for a claim, subject to refutation—
hence the name.
Another way of looking at this feature of arguments from expert opinion
is to say that they are defeasible: They are subject to defeat in light of new
information. Sometimes this new information can come in the form of new
data or evidence which becomes available to the participants in the
argumentative dialogue. Sometimes, though, additional information can be
specifically requested by one of the arguers. For instance, before accepting
16
Several variations of this scheme have appeared in the literature (for a summary see Walton
1997, chap. 3, 200; Walton 1989, 193). One such variation, presented by Walton and Reed (2003,
200) is as follows:
Major Premise: Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false).
Conditional Premise: If source E is an expert in a subject domain S containing proposition A,
and E asserts that proposition A is true (false), then A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).
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the testimony of an expert, we might want to know a bit more about her
credentials or her credibility. To capture this feature of presumptive arguments, it is commonly noted that there is a collection of critical questions,
associated with that type of argument, each of which can be posed in the
form of an objection. Associated with the argument from expert opinion
are the following critical questions.17
Critical Questions for Argument from Expert Opinion
1. Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source?
1.1 What is E’s name, job or official capacity, location, and employer?
1.2 What degrees, professional qualifications or certification by licensing
agencies does E hold?
1.3 Can testimony of peer experts in the same field be given to support
E’s competence?
1.4 What is E’s record of experience, or other indications of practiced
skill in S?
1.5 What is E’s record of peer-reviewed publications or contributions to
knowledge in S?
2. Field Question: Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
2.1 Is the field of expertise cited in the appeal a genuine area of
knowledge, or area of technical skill that supports a claim to
knowledge?
2.2 If E is an expert in a field closely related to the field cited in the
appeal, how close is the relationship between the expertise in the
two fields?
2.3 Is the issue one where expert knowledge in any field is directly
relevant to deciding the issue?
2.4 Is the field of expertise cited an area where there are changes in
techniques or rapid developments in new knowledge, and if so, is
the expert up-to-date in these developments?
3. Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A?
3.1 Was E quoted in asserting A? Was a reference to the source of the
quote given, and can it be verified that E actually said A?
3.2 If E did not say A exactly, then what did E assert, and how was A
inferred?
3.3 If the inference to A was based on more than one premise, could one
premise have come from E and the other from a different expert? If
so, is there evidence of disagreement between what the two experts
(separately) asserted?

17
Again, several versions of these questions have appeared in the literature (for a summary
see Walton 1997, chap. 7).
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3.4 Is what E asserted clear? If not, was the process of interpretation of
what E said by the respondent who used E’s opinion justified? Are
other interpretations plausible? Could important qualifications be
left out?
4. Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source?
4.1 Is E biased?
4.2 Is E honest?
4.3 Is E conscientious?
5. Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
5.1 Does A have general acceptance in S?
5.2 If not, can E explain why not, and give reasons why there is good
evidence for A?
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence?
6.1 What is the internal evidence the expert used herself to arrive at this
opinion as her conclusion?
6.2 If there is external evidence, e.g. physical evidence reported independently of the expert, can the expert deal with this adequately?
6.3 Can it be shown that the opinion given is not one that is scientifically unverifiable?
Function and Probative Effect of Critical Questions
It might be said that these critical questions codify some of the background
information that is assumed by (or implicit in) the argument from expert
opinion. As questions, they function to request the background information
on which the success of the argument depends. As objections, they
challenge the acceptability of the original argument until the additional
information is found to be favorable (to the initial argument). As such, the
central feature of critical questions is that, when they are posed, they act
as undercutting defeaters (Pollock 1995) for the original argumentation.
Until the questions are satisfactorily answered, the original argument is
defective and unacceptable. Moreover, there is no burden of proof associated with posing these critical questions. The questions themselves do not
have to be supported with reasons, or evidence that their answers are
unfavorable to the proponent of the argument from expert opinion.
Instead, it is up to the proponent to demonstrate that they can be
answered. In effect then, while the argumentative result of a presumptive
argument is to shift the burden of proof to an objector, the argumentative
result of posing a critical question is to shift the burden of proof back to
the proponent of the argument.
V. Admissibility Criteria and Critical Questions: A Comparison
We can now proceed to identify specific similarities between a general
dialectical model for arguments involving expert opinion and related
Ratio Juris, Vol. 19, No. 3
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arguments occurring in a legal context. These similarities demonstrate both
the utility and accuracy of the general model to legal argument. First, we
show the similarity of the argumentative effects of the admissibility criteria
and critical questions, and how the effects of each are best explained in
terms of burden of proof. Then we show that the idea of critical questions
can be usefully employed in characterizing the criteria of admissibility for
expert testimony currently used in the American legal system by associating a variety of the admissibility criteria with critical questions mentioned above.

General Features
The first similarities to note are the general features of the admissibility
criteria and critical questions. (For the purposes of this comparison, we will
use the word “test” to indicate both the critical questions and the admissibility criteria discussed above.) In both cases, the employment of any
individual test is at the discretion of the objector or examiner. Furthermore,
the operation of burden of proof is similar with each test. First, the burden
of proof to meet the admissibility criteria rests with the party wishing to
introduce the expert opinion into evidence. The notes to FRE, Rule 702
read, in part, “the admissibility of all expert testimony is governed by the
principles of Rule 104(a).” Under that Rule, the proponent has the burden
of establishing that the pertinent admissibility requirements are met by a
preponderance of the evidence. That is, as with a critical question, it is not
up to the challenger to show that the expert does not meet the criteria.
Further, there is no burden of proof associated with raising one of the
admissibility criteria. Instead, merely raising one of these criteria shifts the
burden of proof back to the proponent (the expert, or the party he or she
represents, or is testifying on behalf of) in regard to the point at issue.18
Finally, the failure to meet any of these criteria acts as a defeater for the
argumentation offered by the expert. The similarity of these general
features gives a prima facie indication that the admissibility criteria for
expert testimony employed in American law are best interpreted as functioning like critical questions in a defeasible argumentation scheme.
18
It should be noted that the shifting of an overall burden of proof at trial may not arise
purely as a result of this kind of challenge. Certainly, the burden of persuasion would not be
affected, and nor might the burden of production, especially if there is still a quantity of
evidence supporting an expert’s credentials. The scientific evidence offered by an expert, and
challenged by challenging her expertise, will only be a part of what Wigmore called a “mixed
mass of evidence,” the cumulative weight of which will actually determine whether a burden
of proof has been met (cf. Wigmore 1940, 270–86, pars. 2485–9). The point we make here is
only that there is no dialectical obligation attached to raising a challenge to one or more of
the admissibility criteria for expert testimony. Rather, whatever obligations arise must be born
by the proponent, and one of these is to respond to such challenges.
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Specific Similarities
Beyond these general similarities, there are also important correspondences
between many of the admissibility factors identified by the American legal
system, and the critical questions associated with the scheme for argument
from expert opinion. For example, among the Daubert factors: The testability factor corresponds directly to the backup evidence question 6.3; the
peer review factor corresponds specifically to expertise sub-question 1.5;
and the general acceptance factor corresponds directly to the consistency
sub-question 5.1.
Similarly with the post-Daubert factors. Questions of bias and conscientiousness (trustworthiness sub-questions 4.1 and 4.3 respectively) roughly
correspond to the post-Daubert factors 1 (independence of research factor)
and 4 (carefulness factor) on our list. The criterion cited in the notes to FRE,
Rule 702 concerning the general reliability of knowledge within the field of
claimed expertise (no. 5 on our list) corresponds exactly to field subquestion 2.1. The criterion concerning alternative explanations cited in the
notes to FRE, Rule 702 (no. 3 on our list) corresponds roughly to backup
evidence question 6.3. And, the last criterion cited by the Harvard Law
Review (no. 8 on our list) concerning the relation of the testimony to the
facts of the case corresponds roughly to field question 2.3.
While we find these similarities remarkable, this is not to say that we
find—nor should we expect to find—a direct, one-to-one correspondence
between each admissibility criterion and some critical question. Indeed,
we have already noted that some questions that might apply to arguments from expert opinion in an everyday context (e.g., expertise question 1.1 pertaining to the identity of the expert) would not typically
apply to the situation in a legal proceeding (the expert would already be
identified). On the other hand, there might be some opportunity to
expand the list of critical questions for the general argumentation
scheme. For example, the post-Daubert factors 2 and 3 (FRE, Rule 702,
notes) could be specifically included by adding an unjust extrapolation
question, and an alternative explanation question. Similarly, existing critical questions might suggest additional admissibility factors that could be
considered.
The broader point, though, is that critical questions and admissibility
factors resemble each other in terms of content and function. There are
many similarities between the critical questions associated with the
general argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion and the
factors that can be considered when determining the admissibility of
testimony professed to be expertise. Moreover, the argumentative effects
of these admissibility criteria which serve to shift the burden of proof back
to the proponent exactly parallel the argumentative effects of critical
questions.
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VI. Admissibility Criteria and Critical Questions: Some Conclusions
These observations yield many important insights. What is most important
is that argumentation theory shows how the criteria for managing expert
opinion evidence need to be structured in a model that takes a dialogic
setting of the argument into account. The central argumentation in a trial
can be structured, in outline, as a critical discussion type of dialogue
(Feteris 1999). The advocates on either side are trying to resolve a conflict
of opinions by using argumentation. Importantly, general and welldeveloped dialogic models of argumentation already exist in argumentation theory, and promise to supply theoretical resources to aid in the
analysis and evaluation of evidence in law.
Within this contextual framework the argumentation employed can be
analysed according to argumentation schemes. These schemes are common
patterns of plausible argument, and reflect the basic idea that the argumentation employed in a courtroom is by and large defeasible, and subject
to refutation in the face of new, contradictory evidence. The use of such
argumentation can be used to meet a burden of proof, and to shift a burden
of proof to an opposing side without ever conclusively establishing the
claim at issue. Further, the critical questions associated with each scheme
provide a means for assessing a particular instance or segment of argumentation. While they may not serve to conclusively refute an argument,
they do function as undercutting defeaters, and have the effect of shifting
the burden of proof back to the proponent of a claim. As Wigmore
describes, this shifting back and forth of the burden of proof seems to
capture the general flow of argumentation in a trial (Wigmore 1940, 270–86,
pars. 2485–9).
Perhaps the most interesting conclusion to be drawn from the comparison we have made in this paper concerns the way in which a proponent
can respond when challenged regarding one of the admissibility factors. It
is our view that these admissibility factors are similar in content and
function to critical questions. Yet, according to the prevailing theory of
critical questions, if asked, a critical question must be answered satisfactorily, otherwise the target argument is defeated. Critical questions associated with a given scheme need not be answered since they are raised at
the discretion of the respondent. (Similarly, admissibility factors are raised
at the discretion of the judge.) Yet, we observed that none of the admissibility criteria are individually necessary. Indeed, some of these criteria
might not pertain to expertise of certain kinds. For instance, criteria
pertaining to the theoretical soundness of a methodology might not be
relevant to skill-based expertise. This suggests that a proponent of expert
testimony need not directly meet each of these criteria even if they are
raised by the judge. Rather, there might be several quite different ways to
show that a criterion has been met.
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For instance, when faced with one of these admissibility criteria, the
proponent could attempt to meet the criterion directly. Here,
(i) the proponent shows that the criterion has been satisfied (direct answer).
On the other hand, the fact that the proponent does not directly satisfy the
criteria does not immediately defeat her argument, nor does it exhaust her
options for response. Another option is that
(ii) the proponent shows that the criterion is not relevant (indirect answer).
This is an indirect answer which shows that, even though the proponent
does not meet the criterion, this is not a failing of her argument. Here,
the reason is that the criterion does not properly pertain to the expertise
professed by the proponent, and as such it is not relevant. Importantly,
some criteria might be universally applicable, and hence always relevant.
For instance, the admissibility criteria are intended to be reasonable
measures of reliability, and some might be so inseparably tied to the idea
of reliability as to be universal. The idea that knowledge be in principle
testable and falsifiable might be such an example (Redmayne 2000). By
contrast, other criteria (such as having a theoretically-based methodology) might not be required in order to ensure reliability of knowledge
in all cases. Such a criterion, if posed to an expert, need not be directly
satisfied in order to demonstrate the admissibility (i.e. reliability) of her
testimony.
Finally, a proponent might choose yet another response option. Again
faced with the situation of not being able to directly satisfy a criterion, a
proponent might seek to show that this is not a failing of her argument on
other grounds. Here,
(iii) the proponent shows that the criterion is not significant (indirect
answer).
In this case, a proponent might argue that her failure to meet the criterion
in question should not be given much weight in view of the fact that other
criteria have been met and their collective merit outweighs the importance
of this criterion. (An example might be publication of results or general
acceptance.) When applied to the general theory of critical questions, these
observations seem to indicate that there may be a variety of means—both
direct and indirect—by which a critical question can be satisfactorily
answered.
Obviously our presentation of the main legal rulings and criteria to
date, along with the argumentation tools that most directly bear on them,
has merely scratched the surface of this important subject. All we have
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done is to point the way to the possibilities of further research concerning
the many vexing problems arising out of expert testimony in law. For
instance, understanding admissibility criteria as critical questions will not
help judges to understand the content of the admissibility criteria themselves (Gatowski et al. 2001). Nor will it replace the need for the judges
to understand the science itself. To apply the admissibility criteria properly, judges likely require a basic knowledge of some fundamental epistemological principles and basic scientific theory in each of the
specialized fields (Federal Judicial Centre 2000). Perhaps effective judges
even require an awareness of some of the sociological, political and
economic issues that intrude upon the practice of science seen as purely
objective inquiry into the truth (Caudill et al. 2003). While our approach
cannot meet all of these needs, we suggest that it offers a promising
avenue for future study.
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